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Abstract — In the European electricity market, transmission 
rights currently evolve from a physical to a financial nature. 
This requires a fundamental change in the underlying market 
design and the institutional setup. This paper applies the 
framework of congestion revenue rights (CRRs) to physical and 
financial transmission rights, which allows a comprehensive 
view on the issue, including financial regulation. Based on this 
framework, two options for transmission price hedging in an 
integrated European electricity market are discussed.  
 
Keywords: Financial Transmission Rights, Congestion 
Revenue Rights, Contracts for Differences, Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a congested electricity network, three distinct types of costs 
associated with congestion can be defined.  These are:  
 
Congestion rent or congestion revenue (see figure 1) is 
defined as the price difference times the flow over a network 
constraint. Congestion rent is collected by those who transfer 
the energy over the constraint (see below). 
Congestion cost (see figure 1) is defined as the system cost 
that results from the inability to dispatch least-cost generation 
due to the constraint. Congestion cost is a deadweight loss, i.e. 
it is social welfare not collected by anybody. 
Cost of congestion to consumers is defined as the extra-cost 
consumers face due to higher prices caused by the constraint, 
i.e. the product of total consumption times the difference 
between the clearing prices with and without constraint. 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Congestion rent and congestion cost. 
 
 
Manuscript of May 22, 2009. 
Christof Duthaler is with the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in 
Lausanne (EPFL), CH-1015 Lausanne, and works for the Swiss 
Transmission System Operator swissgrid ag. (christof.duthaler@epfl.ch; 
phone: +41 76 311 24 33). 
Matthias Finger is with the Chair of Management in Network Industries at 
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL), 
matthias.finger@epfl.ch . 
In the following, we will focus on the congestion revenue, 
since this is the money collected from the market by 
transferring electricity over constraints. Depending on the 
underlying electricity market design, there are two different 
ways of collecting congestion revenue:  
 
1. In a decentralized or self-commitment market, i.e. a 
market based on (physical) bilateral contracts, 
congestion revenue is collected by the market actors 
(producers, consumers, traders) that transfer 
electricity over a constraint by themselves.  
2. In a centralized or central-commitment market, 
congestion revenue is collected by the central 
market operator, i.e. a power exchange (PX) or an 
independent system operator (ISO). The central 
market operator plays the role of a “shipping agent”, 
in the sense that he transfers the energy over 
constraints.  
 
In addition to these two market designs, a hybrid market 
design is conceivable as well. In that case, part of the network 
capacity is reserved for self-commitment (physical bilateral 
trades), while the remainder is used for central-commitment.  
 
II. CONGESTION REVENUE RIGHTS 
A. Definition 
Based on the two ways of collecting congestion revenue, three 
different types of congestion revenue rights (CRRs) can be 
defined:  
 
1. Self-commitment CRR: The congestion revenue is 
received by holding a right to physically deliver 
power over a constraint from hub A  to hub B. A 
self-commitment CRR therefore contains a 
transmission right. 
2. Central-commitment CRR: The congestion revenue 
is received by holding a right on the revenue 
between hub A and hub B that is collected by the 
central market operator. A central-commitment 
CRR therefore does not contain a transmission right. 
Instead, the transmission right remains with the 
central market operator, which plays the role of the 
“shipping agent”. 
3. Hybrid CRR: In a hybrid market model (see above), 
congestion revenue is received by holding either a 
self-commitment CRR or a central-commitment 
CRR, or by holding a hybrid CRR. A hybrid CRR 
can be one of two things:  It is either a 
self-commitment CRR that can be sold back to the 
central market operator in exchange for a 
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central-commitment CRR, or, if there is no 
central-commitment market, a hybrid CRR can be 
defined as a self-commitment CRR that can be sold 
back to the auctioneer of self-commitment CRRs in 
exchange for an auction revenue right (ARR, see 
below).  
 
In the continental European context, a self-commitment CRR 
is typically called a “Physical Transmission Right (PTR)”, 
while the central-commitment CRR is often called “Financial 
Transmission Right (FTR)”. The hybrid CRR is equivalent to 
a PTR that can be sold back to the central market operator or 
PTR auctioneer. Such a CRR is often called a “PTR 
Use-it-or-Sell-it”.  
 
B. Assignment of CRRs 
Regardless of the underlying market design, CRRs can be 
assigned to market actors in three different ways:  
 
1. Allocation (free of charge) 
2. Auction 
3. Combination of allocation and auction 
 
The choice of the assignment method depends on the purpose 
to be fulfilled by the CRR (see below).  
 
Importantly, if CRRs are auctioned, this will result in an 
auction revenue (AR) for the central market operator or CRR 
auctioneer. In the same way as congestion revenue is 
distributed to the holders of CRRs, the distribution of auction 
revenue requires the definition and allocation of auction 
revenue rights (ARRs). How does auction revenue relate to 
congestion revenue? In an ideal market, auction revenue 
would be equal to congestion revenue. In practice, however, 
auction revenue can be bigger, equal, or smaller than 
congestion revenue.  The outcome depends on how market 
actors bid for CRRs.  
 
Furthermore, CRRs can be assigned either between any two 
hubs of an electricity network (centralized CRR) or only 
between adjacent hubs of a network (decentralized CRR, 
sometimes called “Flowgate right”). While the former option 
requires a single market operator accessing the congestion 
revenue of the whole relevant network, the latter option allows 
for decentralized market operators issuing CRRs (as is the 
case today in Europe).  
 
By distinguishing between self- and central-commitment 
CRRs, and between allocating and auctioning CRRs, four 
different ways of assigning CRRs to the market have to be 
considered. In the following, the four procedures are 
described from the perspective of the CRR issuing entity (e.g., 
the grid operator or the central market operator):   
 
1. Self-commitment CRR, Allocation 
a. Allocation of CRRs 
2. Self-commitment CRR, Auction 
a. Allocation of ARRs 
b. Auctioning of CRRs 
c. Distribution of AR to holders of ARRs 
3. Central-commitment CRR, Allocation 
a. Allocation of CRRs 
b. Collection of CR 
c. Distribution of CR to holders of CRRs 
4. Central-commitment CRR, Auction 
a. Allocation of ARRs  
b. Auctioning of CRRs 
c. Collection of CR 
d. Distribution of CR to holders of CRRs 
e. Distribution of AR to holders of ARRs 
 
There are real-world experiences with all of these assignment 
methods:  
 
1. Self-commitment CRR, Allocation: This is typical 
for existing transmission contracts (ETCs), in 
Europe often called long term contracts (LTCs). 
2. Self-commitment CRR, Auction: This is a typical 
European PTR auction. 
3. Central-commitment CRR, Allocation: Several 
restructured US electricity markets allocate part of 
their CRRs to certain market actors. 
4. Central-commitment CRR, Auction: PJM and other 
restructured US electricity markets auction all or 
part of their CRRs to market actors.  
 
Besides these four ways of assigning CRRs, there are also 
markets that (currently) do not feature CRRs are at all. 
Examples are New Zealand or the market of the Nordic 
countries. We will come back to these cases later in this 
article.  
 
C. Volume of CRRs 
How many CRRs can be given to market actors by the CRR 
issuing entity? Importantly, the feasible volume of CRRs, 
whether self- or central-commitment, is always limited by the 
physical network capacity.  With self-commitment CRRs, an 
over-allocation would create too many physical flows and 
endanger the network security. With central-commitment 
CRRs, physical flows are not an issue, since the units are 
centrally committed. However, an over-allocation of CRRs 
would endanger the revenue adequacy of the central market 
operator, since congestion revenues collected by the market 
operator would no longer cover total payments to CRR 
holders. To prevent an over-allocation of CRRs, the market 
operator has to perform a simultaneous feasibility test (SFT). 
This is necessary for both a centralized and a decentralized 
assignment of CRR, though it is more demanding for a 
centralized assignment. The SFT is the reason why a CRR 
issuance disconnected from the underlying physical network 
and its constraints is not possible. Even so, the SFT remains 
vulnerable to a changing grid topology in the time span 
between the issuance and the settlement of CRRs.  
 
  
 
CRRs can be defined as options or as obligations. An option 
can be used (its value will be positive or zero), while an 
obligation has to be used (its value can be positive or 
negative). A CRR obligation therefore can turn into a payment 
obligation for its holder, namely when the CRR is defined 
from a high price to a low price hub. In this case, the holder of 
a self-commitment CRR obligation has to “buy high and sell 
low” the electricity, while the holder of a central-commitment 
CRR has to pay the price difference between the two hubs to 
the central market operator.  In the SFT described above, the 
physical (self-commitment) or financial (central-commitment) 
flows associated with CRR obligations can be taken for 
granted. Thus, CRRs defined in opposite directions cancel out 
each other. This is why for a certain network capacity, the 
volume of CRR obligations that can be allocated is higher than 
the volume of CRR options.  
 
D. Purpose of CRRs 
Next, let’s turn to the purpose of CRRs. Indeed, self- and 
central-commitment CRRs have several and in part differing 
purposes: 
 
 
1)  Self-commitment CRR 
 
1. Scheduling of energy: In a self-commitment market, 
a CRR is indeed required by market actors to deliver 
electricity over a constraint. This is the transmission 
right component of the CRR.  
2. Transmission investment: If a merchant investor 
builds a new line, he could be allocated a physical 
CRR for it, which is equivalent to using the line 
exclusively.  
3. Transmission price hedging: The transmission price, 
and thus the congestion price risk, is fixed in advance 
through the CRR auction.   
 
2)  Central-commitment CRR 
 
1. Offset redistribution of economic rents from tariff 
reforms: As an example, the introduction of nodal 
pricing in a former uniform price market implies that 
some market actors will face higher or lower prices. 
By allocating CRRs, such a redistribution of 
economic rents can be offset without impeding the 
signals given by nodal pricing, and without 
precluding the dispatch efficiency gained by 
switching from a self-commitment to a 
central-commitment market.  
2. Replacement of Existing Transmission Contracts 
(ETCs): This is essentially a special case of purpose 
number 1. An allocated self-commitment CRR is 
replaced by an allocated central-commitment CRR. 
The former ETC holder is financially hedged, while 
the ETC capacity is freed up for the central market 
operator [1].  
3. Transmission investment: Instead of a 
self-commitment CRR, a merchant investor can be 
allocated a financial CRR to reap the financial 
benefits of a new line, while the line is used by the 
central market operator.  
4. Transmission price hedging: As with 
self-commitment CRRs, the auction price 
pre-determines the price for using transmission.  
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the intended purpose of CRRs 
determines the choice of how to assign them. On one hand, to 
offset the redistribution of economic rents (including the 
replacement of ETCs) and to finance merchant transmission 
investments, CRRs will be allocated free of charge to the 
relevant market actors. On the other hand, auctioning CRRs is 
sufficient to hedge transmission prices. Of course, instead of 
allocating CRRs, a market operator can also allocate ARRs 
and auction off corresponding CRRs. It can be argued that 
compared to allocating CRRs, auctioning CRRs is more 
flexible and efficient, reaches a broader range of market 
actors, and allows determining a market price for 
transmission. In practice, some market operators allocate one 
part of their CRRs to certain market actors (e.g. to ETC 
holders) and auction the remaining CRRs to general market 
actors. 
 
As described above, the choice between self- and 
central-commitment CRRs depends on the underlying market 
design. Theoretically, it can be shown that 
central-commitment attains a higher overall dispatch 
efficiency [2]. Nevertheless, market actors used to 
self-commitment are often reluctant to cede dispatching 
authority to a central market operator.  
Regarding the choice between centralized and decentralized 
assignment of CRRs (see above), a centralized assignment is 
likely to be more efficient, requiring of course  a single market 
operator for the whole relevant network.  
 
E. CRRs and the usage of congestion revenue 
Whether or not CRRs are implemented, congestion revenue 
can be used for several purposes: 
 
1. Funding of past network investments 
2. Funding of future network investments (as proposed 
by the 3rd EU energy package) 
3. Funding of operational expenditures (e.g., 
redispatch cost) 
4. Funding of CRRs (see above on the purpose of 
CRRs) 
 
As long as CRRs are auctioned (not allocated) to market 
actors, the congestion revenue stream is not ended, but 
transformed into an auction revenue stream. Therefore, you 
can auction CRRs as a transmission price hedging and use the 
congestion revenue or rather the auction revenue for one of the 
first three purposes. Keep in mind, though, that auction 
  
 
revenues can be bigger, equal or smaller than congestion 
revenues. However, if you have to allocate CRRs after the 
introduction of zonal or nodal pricing in order to offset the 
redistribution of economic rents, congestion revenues can no 
longer be used for funding past or future network investments 
or operational expenditures. In that respect, the 3rd EU energy 
package, even though aiming at a European market 
integration, is based on the assumption that congestion 
remains (only) on national boundaries, where there are no 
historical claims to congestion revenues (see part III below).  
 
III. CRRS IN THE CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY 
MARKET 
 
A. Regulation of CRRs in the EU 
With regard to the regulation of CRRs in Europe, the question 
is whether CRRs, and especially central-commitment CRRs 
(which do not include a transmission right), are to be seen as 
financial instruments and have to be regulated accordingly. If 
so, the EU directive 2004/39 on markets in financial 
instruments (MiFID) and the MiFID Implementation 
Regulation (MIR) 1287/2006 (including organizational 
requirements and rules on customer relations, transparency, 
reporting, record-keeping, etc.) as well as associated capital 
requirements (EU directives 2006/48 and 2006/49) may apply 
to CRR market participants.  
The financial instruments covered by MiFID are listed in its 
Annex 1, Section C. If anything, CRRs could qualify as 
commodity derivatives. Indeed, if electricity transmission 
capacity is defined as a commodity, then CRRs could be seen 
as derivatives (options or futures) on the price of transmission 
capacity. MIR article 2.1 defines commodities as “any goods 
of a fungible nature that are capable of being delivered, 
including metals and their ores and alloys, agricultural 
products, and energy such as electricity.” According to this 
definition, electricity transmission capacity is not a 
commodity, and hence CRRs are not commodity derivatives 
in the sense of MiFID Annex 1 Section C. This is also how 
(central-commitment) CRRs are regulated in the U.S.: They 
are not covered by the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) [1], although this is currently reviewed 
(see below). 
 
However, MiFID Annex 1 Section C(10) adds another group 
of underlyings covered by MiFID:  
 
“Options, futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and any 
other derivative contracts relating to climatic variables, freight 
rates, emission allowances or inflation rates or other official 
economic statistics that must be settled in cash or may be 
settled in cash at the option of one of the parties (otherwise 
than by reason of a default or other termination event), as well 
as any other derivative contracts relating to assets, rights, 
obligations, indices and measures not otherwise mentioned in 
this Section, which have the characteristics of other derivative 
financial instruments, having regard to whether, inter alia, 
they are traded on a regulated market or an MTF, are cleared 
and settled through recognised clearing houses or are subject 
to regular margin calls.” 
 
MIR article 39 then further specifies which underlyings 
qualify as “C10 underlyings”. Letter c) mentions 
“transmission or transportation capacity relating to 
commodities, whether cable, pipeline or other means”.  
Thus, electricity transmission capacity qualifies as a C10 
underlying covered by MiFID. 
 
Does this mean that CRRs qualify as C10 derivatives? No. 
MIR article 38.4 makes the crucial exemption: “A contract 
shall be considered to be for commercial purposes for the 
purposes of Section C(7) of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC, 
and as not having the characteristics of other derivative 
financial instruments for the purposes of Sections C(7) and 
(10) of that Annex, if it is entered into with or by an operator 
or administrator of an energy transmission grid, energy 
balancing mechanism or pipeline network, and it is necessary 
to keep in balance the supplies and uses of energy at a given 
time.” 
 
Since CRRs by definition have to be issued by an “operator or 
administrator” of the electricity transmission grid, and it is 
indeed necessary to keep in balance the supplies and uses of 
electricity at any given time, MiFID would consider CRRs to 
be for commercial (instead of purely financial) purpose and as 
not having the characteristics of derivatives on C10 
underlyings. Consequently, CRRs do not fall under MiFID 
regulation for the time being. Keep in mind, though, that MIR 
article 40 foresees regular re-examinations of the criteria 
mentioned above and the instruments that will qualify as 
financial instruments.  
 
Is the exception according to MIR article 38.4 justified? It can 
be argued that contracts issued by a network operator or 
administrator are by definition part of the spot market. At the 
example of CRRs, whether self- or central-commitment, both 
their volume and their value are purely determined by the 
electricity network capacity and the spot market prices.  
Manipulation of CRRs is equivalent to manipulating the 
network, generation or consumption, all of which is covered 
by traditional energy regulation. Energy regulation therefore 
should include CRRs as an integral part of the spot market.  
Additionally, the balancing requirement of electricity should, 
at least in theory, prevent market participants from 
withholding or flooding the market with electricity, two of the 
most powerful forms of manipulation in other commodity 
markets. In practice, however, examples such as the Enron 
case in California showed that market actors, especially if they 
possess market power, actually can withhold electricity and 
drive prices up, sometimes even endangering the network 
security.  
Moreover, at the example of CRRs, several financial risks are 
involved. The auctioning of both self- and 
central-commitment CRRs involves a credit risk for the 
issuing entity and therefore requires collaterals by market 
  
 
actors. And both types of CRRs pose a financial risk to their 
holders (especially in the case of CRR obligations, since they 
can turn into a payment obligation) as well to the issuing entity 
(in case of a revenue inadequacy). According to the U.S. 
regional transmission organization PJM, it is because of these 
risks that the U.S. CFTC currently reviews the need to 
regulate CRRs. 
 
How would the financial regulation of CRRs in Europe look 
like without the exception granted in MIR article 38.4? In this 
case, MIR article 38.3 specifies three conditions. If a C10 
derivative satisfies at least one of them, it will be considered 
as having the characteristics of other derivative financial 
instruments, i.e. it will be regulated: 
 
“(a) that contract is settled in cash or may be settled in cash at 
the option of one or more of the parties, otherwise than by 
reason of a default or other termination event; 
(b) that contract is traded on a regulated market or an MTF; 
(c) the conditions laid down in [article 38.1] are satisfied in 
relation to that contract.” 
 
MIR article 38.1 provides three conditions, namely 1) trading 
on a regulated market, multilateral trading facility (MTF) or 
third country trading facility, 2) clearing by a clearing house 
or a central counterparty, 3) standardization of the contracts. 
 
The cash settlement condition of MIR article 38.3 may indeed 
distinguish between self- and central-commitment CRRs, 
despite their common, often commercial purpose: 
Self-commitment CRRs can be settled only physically by the 
issuing entity (through provision of transmission capacity), 
while central-commitment CRRs can be settled only in cash 
(through congestion revenue). A central-commitment CRR 
would therefore be considered as a regulated financial 
instruments. A self-commitment CRR would not qualify as 
long as it cannot be settled in cash (note: a hybrid CRR can be 
settled in cash), it is not traded on a regulated market or an 
MTF (note: secondary markets could qualify as MTFs), and 
the conditions of MIR article 38.1 are not met. 
 
Apart from exemptions to certain financial instruments, 
MiFID also exempts certain companies from its regulation. 
Article 22 in the introduction to the MIR states that:  
 
“The exemptions in Directive 2004/39/EC that relate to 
dealing on own account or to dealing or providing other 
investment services in relation to commodity derivatives 
covered by Sections C(5), C(6) and C(7) of Annex I to that 
Directive or derivatives covered by Section C(10) of that 
Annex I could be expected to exclude significant numbers 
of commercial producers and consumers of energy and 
other commodities, including energy suppliers, commodity 
merchants and their subsidiaries from the scope of that 
Directive, and therefore such participants will not be 
required to apply the tests in this Regulation to determine if 
the contracts they deal in are financial instruments.” 
 
B. Potential usage  of CRRs in the continental European 
electricity market 
 
Cross-border electricity trading in continental Europe is 
predominantly based on self-commitment (i.e. physical 
bilateral contracts) between adjacent countries [3]. 
Consequently, network operators mostly assign decentralized 
self-commitment CRRs, or, in some cases, hybrid CRRs, to 
market actors by way of auctions (called “explicit auctioning 
of PTRs”).  
Meanwhile, the introduction of central-commitment CRRs is 
discussed in Europe. Apart from the fundamental change in 
the  market design and the institutional setup that is required 
(i.e. a central market operator operating the constraints 
between countries, see above), how would the different 
purposes of central-commitment CRRs (see section II.D) 
apply to the European context? 
 
1. Offset redistribution of economic rents from tariff 
reforms: This is currently not an issue in Europe, 
since there are no historical claims to congestion 
rents between national markets. A uniform 
European electricity market that would justify such 
cross-border claims did not exist historically. This is 
the difference between the introduction of 
intra-market CRRs (typical for U.S. ISOs) and 
inter-market CRRs (the European case). However, 
the situation would change as soon as Europe opts 
for the introduction of nodal pricing or price zones 
other than the political ones today. In that case, at 
least part of the CRRs may have to be allocated to 
offset the redistribution of economic rents. 
2. Replacement of Existing Transmission Contracts 
(ETCs): As an exception to number 1, this could be 
an issue in Europe, since there exist some ETCs 
between countries. It is a special case, however. 
3. Transmission investment: This is problematic in 
Europe, since commercial constraints are defined 
only between countries, and therefore congestion 
revenue only arises between countries. However, 
actual physical constraints often lie within countries. 
A merchant investment policy based on CRRs would 
therefore lead to investments at the wrong or at least 
sub-optimal places. Essentially, a coherent merchant 
investment policy would require full nodal pricing 
throughout Europe.  
4. Transmission price hedging: Apart from the special 
case of ETCs, transmission price hedging remains as 
the only valid purpose of central-commitment CRRs 
in Europe. To achieve a truly integrated European 
electricity market, centralized central-commitment 
CRRs would be required, i.e. CRRs between any 
two European hubs, even though decentralized 
central-commitment CRRs between existing hubs 
(i.e. countries) may be a first step.  
 
  
 
This analysis leads to the following question: If commercial 
transmission price hedging remains as the sole purpose of 
central-commitment CRRs in Europe, does this justify the use 
of congestion revenues and the implementation of a 
centralized CRR auctioning system?  
On one hand, a hedge against locational price risk may be 
necessary to encourage competitors from outside of a market 
to enter that market even without possessing own generation 
there. Without a transmission price hedge, such competitors 
would be left unprotected against locational price risk. This is 
the experience made in New Zealand, which operates a nodal 
market without CRRs since 1996 [4].  
On the other hand, the centralized auctioning of CRRs 
requires a single operator with access to the regional 
congestion revenue and the regional network model. 
Moreover, the connection to congestion revenues creates a 
financial risk to the market operator and eventually to the 
rate-payers, since an over-allocation of CRRs would cause a 
revenue inadequate situation. Mitigating this risk means 
scaling-down pay-outs to CRR holders in case of a revenue 
inadequacy.  
 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO CRRS 
If European policy makers perceive a need for an instrument 
to hedge transmission prices in order to foster a true European 
electricity market, but at the same time refrain from a 
centralized CRR auctioning system, then which alternatives 
are on the table? To answer this question, one has to look at 
who can hedge the transmission price risk (also called the 
locational price risk) between two arbitrary hubs A and B. In 
fact, there are two entities capable of doing that:  
 
1. The central market operator that collects the 
congestion rent between A and B. He could issue 
CRRs as described above.  
2. A market actor that trades in the opposite direction, 
i.e. from B to A, or a combination of an actor 
exporting from B to a reference hub and another 
actor importing from the reference hub to A. At the 
reference hub, the single system price for an 
unconstrained network would be determined, i.e. the 
pure energy price without any locational 
(congestion) cost. The locational price risk of 
someone exporting from A or B cancels out with the 
risk of someone importing to A or B, and vice versa. 
Those actors would sign a “Contract for Difference 
(CFD)”, i.e. a forward contract on the difference 
between the system price and an area or hub price. 
Importantly, a load in area A is actually exporting 
from the area price A to the system price (hedging 
against rising area price), while a producer in area A 
is actually importing from the system price to the 
area price A (hedging against falling area price). 
 
The CFD model is the one implemented by Nordpool in the 
Nordic market [5, 6].  
How do CFDs compare with CRRs? The key difference is that 
CFDs have no connection to the congestion revenue. This in 
turn has several implications:  
 
1. There is  no need for a simultaneous feasibility test 
(SFT) that depends on the network capacity and has 
to be run by a central operator. 
2. Commercial risks are shared between market actors, 
not between market actors and the rate payers (via a 
revenue inadequacy of the market operator).  
3. CFDs may face a liquidity problem, since there is no 
“natural” counter-party with access to the congestion 
rents.  
 
There are some measures that help improving the liquidity of a 
CFD market, for instance: 
 
1. Electricity price futures should be available only on 
one price reference, namely the unconstrained 
system price, but not on the several area prices. That 
way, not only traders between areas will participate 
in the CFD market, but also producers and 
consumers within areas, since they would like to 
hedge the locational price risk between the system 
price and their respective area price.  
2. Area price zones have to include a sufficiently large 
number of producers and consumers as potential 
CFD market participants. This is why CFDs are not 
feasible in a nodal electricity market. However,  to 
increase liquidity, even CRRs are usually not defined 
between any two network nodes, but from trading 
hubs (aggregated network nodes) to load zones and 
generation nodes, while electricity price futures are 
based on trading hub prices.  The NYMEX futures 
on the PJM Western Hub are a prominent example of 
this scheme [7].  
 
The introduction of CFDs in the European electricity market 
would therefore require the computation of a European system 
price for the unconstrained network (basis for forward/future 
contracts), and the computation of area or country prices 
(basis for CFDs).  
 
With regard to EU regulation, energy market CFDs (not to be 
mistaken with financial contracts for differences on stock 
price variations etc.) are likely to be covered by MiFID, since 
MIR article 38.4 does not apply to CFDs.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper applied the framework of congestion revenue 
rights (CRRs) to physical and financial transmission rights.  
The CRRs associated with the two fundamental electricity 
market designs, i.e. self- and central-commitment markets, 
were described. The institutional requirements of centralized, 
central-commitment CRRs (“FTRs” between any two hubs) 
were highlighted, namely a single market operator with access 
  
 
to the regional congestion revenue and the regional network 
model (for determining a simultaneously feasible set of 
CRRs).  
With regard to financial regulation, both self- and 
central-commitment CRRs would not be considered as 
financial instruments by current European legislation 
(MiFID). The different purposes of CRRs were described. It 
was shown that in the European context, the purpose of 
central-commitment CRRs would be limited primarily to the 
commercial hedging of locational price risk. In principle, this 
could be achieved as well by user-based forward products 
such as contracts for difference (CFDs). Since CFDs have no 
connection to congestion revenues, rate-payers would not face 
a financial risk as in the case of a CRR revenue inadequacy. 
The liquidity requirements of a European CFD market should 
therefore be examined carefully, especially with regard to the 
required size of price zones. 
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